



Overcoming the stalemate!

Alternative voices on climate policy and development

Report of the international youth project
and the final conference 22 – 29 September 2012
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Preface

The world today is facing a mounting crisis: In addition to the environmental crisis, during the last few years the world has experienced a financial and economic crisis as well as a structural crisis in equity and justice, including growing inequalities within and between countries as well as an increase in poverty and hunger. At the same time, it has become more and more obvious that these growing global challenges cannot be solved by nation states alone but only collectively by the international community based on an intensified dialogue between industrialized, newly emerging and developing countries and between all different groups of stakeholders.

One of the most important target groups to strengthen the debate on global challenges and possible global governance structures to address them are young people: On the one hand, they represent the greatest share of population in many developing countries, on the other hand, they are the ones who will have to cope with the consequences of today's generations' failure to adequately deal with challenges such as global warming. Therefore, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) actively promotes young leaders from politics, trade unions, media and science worldwide and supports them in qualifying in their respective fields of expertise, in building up networks and in getting future leading positions. FES's engagement in international youth cooperation is based on the premise that – through an inclusive and responsive global policy approach – globalization can be shaped into a direction that promotes peace, democracy and social justice.

In this context the first 'Shaping Globalization' conference has to be seen which took place in Bonn in November 2010. It was organized jointly by the Forum Youth and Politics and the Department for Global Policy and Development of the FES. The conference provided a platform for an open exchange of experiences and ideas between young professionals and youth leaders from all over the world. During the one-week conference the participants delved into deep discussions on what their policy priorities on climate protection and sustainable development would be if they had a say. The results were published in early 2011 under the title "Shaping Globalization – a Young Agenda on Climate Protection, Sustainable Growth and Development, and Global Governance".

The present publication follows from the second 'Shaping Globalization' conference in Berlin in September 2012. This time, 33 young professionals and youth leaders from 17 different countries came together to exchange their ideas on climate protection and sustainable development. The focus of this conference was laid on climate related issues, but the overall structure was similar to the first conference:

Before the conference started, the participants joined an online platform on which they were invited to discuss their general understanding of globalization and climate change, as well as the apparent crisis of multilateralism. The at times heated online discussions paved the way for an intense and open dialogue during the five conference days in Berlin. Some selected quotes from those discussions are spread out over the paper. Like two years ago, the conference included expert inputs and discussions, a two-day simulation of a UN-climate conference and a so-called idea's workshop. The overall aim of the conference was to learn about climate policy, share experiences and to generate concrete ideas, proposals and demands on how to address climate change more effectively.

During the conference, the participants had the opportunity to share their thoughts and questions with distinguished experts in the field, namely Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker (*Co-President of Club of Rome and former SPD Member of German Parliament*), Nicole Wilke (*German Federal Ministry for the Environment, head of the EU delegation to the climate talks in Doha 2012*), Martin Frick (*German Federal Foreign Office, Representative to the International Organisations based in Germany, including the UNFCCC*), and Ulrich Kelber (*Member of German Parliament, Vice Chairman of SPD Parliamentary Group*).

With regard to the two-day simulation of the climate talks in Doha the participants' overall feedback was that they could now more easily understand why politics is such a tough game and why there is so little progress at the international level. It also helped to get a more realistic picture of what is feasible in the framework of the UN-led climate talks. That apart, it strengthened the participants' belief that it is of great importance to



further develop local and regional approaches to climate change that add to or even go beyond the efforts made at the international political level.

With this in mind, participants reflected after the simulation game on their individual concerns, criticisms, as well as hopes and visions with regard to the future of climate policies in the idea's workshop. Some of the participants' ideas were radical and visionary; others were more pragmatic – reflecting the general differences between participants in approaching policy issues. On the last day, we invited the participants to develop concrete project proposals that could be implemented in their respective home region. The proposals will be presented to offices of the FES in the respective countries with the hope that they can be further discussed, developed and eventually realized.

At the end of this publication you find a brief summary of three select project proposals together with an individual reflection on the lessons learnt from the simulation game by Romi Reinecke, one participant from South Africa.

The main part of this publication, however, is a collection of essays written by conference participants based on their contributions during the conference. The range

of issues discussed is relatively broad, reflecting the diversity of participants' backgrounds as well as their policy preferences. And while the outline of the publication is different to the first one in 2011, some questions and points of discussion reappear: How viable is the current global economic system in the long term? Should we strive for a period of de-growth? Or is the key to success the de-linking of growth from carbon emissions? Is the current UN framework leading us anywhere in dealing with climate change? Or do we need different, possibly local approaches and best practice models? The answers to these fundamental questions are diverse, but worth a read! Enjoy!

*Simon Raiser and Björn Warkalla,
January 2013*

Introduction

Simon Raiser and
Björn Warkalla

Beyond the globalization dilemma – new perspectives on climate policy

The same old story? Stalemate in UN-led climate talks

Does the following paragraph somehow sound familiar to you? 'After the end of the talks, the ministers from all over the world appeared in front of the cameras and underlined that the talks were intense and difficult, but successful, and that the results represent a new milestone on the way to a global approach in fighting climate change.' This time: Doha, December 2012. But it could have been any other UN-led climate conference in the past years.

In reality, everyone knows that the results have – again – been meager, to say the least: No new emission reduction commitments; the follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol postponed; and the European Union giving up their leading role in climate protection because one member state (coal-dependent Poland – on Poland's position during the negotiations see *Artur Wiczorek's* article in this paper) refused to accept a new 30% reduction commitment until 2020, although the EU as of today has already reduced emissions by roughly 18% compared to 1990.

No, Doha was not what you call a success story. Neither was the Rio+20 conference in June 2012. The only sign of hope coming from Rio was the agreement that a more comprehensive sustainable development framework is needed. An expert commission is to develop sustainable development goals, which are supposed to address economic, social and environmental dimensions of development. This is to happen in a holistic way as part of a broader framework dealing with issues such as poverty eradication, but with enhanced environmental considerations. Yet, no clear commitments have so far come from any side.

And thus both international summits of 2012 stand to exemplify the dilemma of globalization (Saxer 2009) which today seems more pertinent than ever: i.e. the dilemma between the growing interdependence of societies and the emergence of genuinely global problems that call for joint political action on the one hand, and the simultaneous crisis of multilateralism on the other hand. The latter is a result of interests continuing to be predominantly defined along the lines of national borders.

Concerning the problem of climate change, this globalization dilemma is well documented by the rather grim projections with regard to international efforts to reduce global warming: While the international community finally managed in Cancún in 2010 to formally adopt the goal to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius, the World Bank warned in November 2012 that the world will heat up by four degrees Celsius on average by the end of this century if the global community fails to act more effectively on climate change (World Bank 2012).

The implications of such a scenario for the environment and for humanity as a whole would be devastating – but this is not a new insight. In fact, the latest scientific data only confirm what has been clear for more than decades: if the international community fails to finally make a huge step forward in their efforts to prevent dangerous climate change, the implications will include extreme heat-waves, declining food stocks and a sea-level rise affecting hundreds of millions of people. But this has been the same story for a long time, at least since the UNCED Conference in Rio 1992. Even the greatest skeptics regarding the scientific projections on climate change acknowledge that something needs to be done. And yet, most experts and policy makers agree that too little is done with regard to binding commitments.

What future role for the UN?

The resulting question is: is there a way out of this dilemma? There are different answers to this. The proponents of the mainstream, top-down approach, politicians and scientists alike, continue to call for concerted action and legally-binding commitments on the international level – despite being aware of the fact that it is unrealistic to expect any dramatic breakthroughs in the negotiations soon. This was also the position represented by our guests Mrs Wilke and Mr Frick, both experienced negotiators on behalf of the German government. While acknowledging that progress within the UNFCCC framework was painfully slow at best, they still argued passionately that there is no alternative – and that contrary to popular perception, considerable progress had actually been made in the last decades.



However, as among experts and policy makers in general, there were also different opinions on this among the conference participants, not least after they had experienced the above mentioned stalemate during the simulation game on the climate talks in Doha – as described by *Romi Reinecke* from South Africa in her contribution to this publication. Most participants would continue to regard the UN as the most important forum for dealing with climate change. But opinions diverged as to the question which lessons should be drawn from the slow progress and, perhaps even more importantly, which functions the UN should actually perform in the future.

At the minimum, the UN is seen as *the* forum for legitimizing decisions and commitments for all. No alternative institution exists yet that could perform this function, particularly considering the democratic rights of the less powerful nations which enjoy the same voting rights in the UN's one country one vote-system as the most powerful countries. But this asset also contributes to the UN processes' major weakness: Building consensus is a very difficult affair with a good 190 states present at the deliberations. Therefore, it is increasingly doubtful whether the UN should also be the only forum for the generation of solutions and the manufacturing of consent.

One option, as *Andrew Holland* (USA) argues in his contribution, would be to "mainstream" climate change by

making it a priority at every international negotiation. This would also help to demonstrate the linkages between climate change and other issues, such as security, gender, development etc. Holland also argues that while the result might not be a whole range of legally binding commitments, it could help build political support for climate policy on the domestic level, an aspect also emphasized by our expert Mr Kelber (from the SPD, the German Social Democratic Party) and by *Mariana González Araujo* (Mexico) in her essay.

Beyond mainstream approaches

In addition, there is arguably a case for more realism at the negotiations. If international negotiations have so far failed to produce the results necessary for achieving the agreed-upon two-degree-limit, wouldn't it be time to admit as much? Or to put it differently: Why is a goal upheld that is widely regarded as unachievable? Because obviously a lot stands to be lost. Abandoning the goal would imply admitting to political failure on the global level. And by continuing to officially declare their support for the goal while failing to translate this support into political action, the big polluters can continue blaming the others for blocking the progress.

One is tempted to believe that sticking to the unrealistic two-degree-goal serves to mask the political deadlock



evident on the international stage. Some experts consequently claim that the annual climate talks do not lead the world anywhere and that the two-degree goal should be abandoned (Geden 2012) – thereby admitting that the top-down paradigm has failed. This would be done not with the aim of giving up on climate policy, but on the contrary of allowing for the exploration of different routes to preventing disastrous climate change. This holds true both for concrete political action as well as scientific contributions that predominantly follow a mainstream framework of analysis and resulting advice – a fact strongly deplored by *Varun Sharma* from India in this publication.

There are many ideas for this, some of which were touched upon at the Shaping Globalisation conference. What many of these ideas share is a renewed emphasis on bottom-up strategies, such as a return to locally or nationally focused climate change agendas based on the principle of “the less the better” (Rayner 2010). In other words, each country would strive for individual measurable progress in decarbonising their economies.

Decoupling and energy efficiency

The key to success here would be *decoupling* GDP growth from CO₂-emissions. This could be done by developing new incentive-led and flexible cooperation

mechanisms between countries but also between industrial sectors (Geden 2012). The introduction of flexible benchmarks to reduction aims could relieve states from too high expectations and increase the incentives to aim at realistic reductions while retaining moderate economic growth.

Another option would be to shift attention from the reduction of CO₂-emissions to increasing energy efficiency. Conventional approaches to decarbonisation suggest that CO₂-emissions in the industrialised countries would need to be reduced by at least 80%. However, as our expert Mr von Weizsäcker together with a team of experts projected, it is possible to reach a five-fold increase of resource efficiency which would in turn reduce the necessity of limiting carbon emissions to 20-30% – a figure that seems much more realistic. The key message of the various examples given by Weizsäcker is that the turnaround in energy policy is feasible technically and at the same time reasonable economically as it would create new jobs and wealth (Weizsäcker et al 2009). But how can we increase the likelihood that such an energy turnaround will become reality?

Leaving it solely to the markets – as suggested by the incentive-led mechanisms mentioned above – will, according to critics, not necessarily lead to optimal results; at least it will most likely result in socially imbalanced effects. Hence, one option would be to consider the

political decision to artificially raise energy prices. If this is paralleled with the necessary improvements in energy efficiency, average expenses for energy services could remain stable. That such a path would be possible and desirable is argued by *Ro'ee Levy* (Israel) and *Sebastian Ehreiser* (USA) in this publication.

Green growth vs. de-growth

The above mentioned options are linked to the more general idea of shifting towards a green economy, acknowledging that the “old” way of doing business, based on finite fossil fuels and the exploitation of natural resources, is no longer possible. There is however, a struggle for ideological hegemony with regard to the conflicting concepts of green growth and de-growth (Netzer, Althaus 2012). The green growth-model advocates for a more sustainable use of natural resources on the basis of market-induced incentives for reducing CO₂-emissions and increasing energy efficiency. A more radical approach goes one step further: it questions the overall logic of our market-led economic system which is based on the unfettered belief that economic growth is indispensable for human and social development.

The proponents of a new paradigm claim that the term *sustainable development* in itself is an oxymoron as the current idea of development based on economic growth cannot be sustainable. In their view underdeveloped countries would need to grow enormously until they could attain a level of development similar to that of the richer countries. But if underdeveloped societies imitate Western consumption patterns based on the idea of accumulating material possessions this would lead to devastating environmental and social damage.

Thus, they assert, a new paradigm is needed for an alternative, ecologically sustainable and socially equitable de-growth society. This development path would be characterized by an equitable downscaling of production and consumption that would increase human well-being and improve ecological conditions at the local and global level, in the short and long term (Lattouche 2004, Schneider 2010). *Alana Moraes* from Brazil and *Namami Sharma* from India in this publication

both point to the important role that social movements such as trade unions, feminist movements, the landless movement and the indigenous peoples would need to play in the process of coming up with such a new development paradigm.

Towards bottom-up approaches in climate policy

While the above-mentioned options and approaches lead away from the UN-led global climate talks, they are based on very different understandings of how best to tackle climate change from the bottom up. The key difference is between those who advocate reliance on market-based mechanisms and those who more fundamentally criticize the logic of markets. And it is this fundamental difference that among others dominated the discussions during the 2nd Shaping Globalization Conference in Berlin in September 2012. Some of the fundamental questions that came up during the discussions among participants included: Do we actually need growth for development or can development be achieved without economic growth? Do we need a more sustainable level of consumption? Do we need to “de-grow?” Or is the trick to grow while reducing carbon emissions at the same time (“decoupling”)?

Another related issue that came up during the discussions is whether we need a new development paradigm coming from the developing economies as the rich countries are mainly interested in keeping the status quo. While participants all seemed to agree that there is no alternative to globalization, many of the participants coming from developing countries maintained that there should be room for local interpretations of global processes in order to take into account local and regional particularities.

And this leads us back to the idea of a paradigm shift towards bottom-up approaches in tackling climate change. Local responses from societies and people who are directly affected by climate change already serve as best practice among vulnerable societies – what other choice do they have? Waiting for governments to accept binding reduction goals is not a practical option. From these local best practices new options and visions

for a sustainable society could emerge. But unlike the idea of creating a global climate contract with binding reduction goals for all countries, this approach is much more diversified and flexible as well as adaptable to the actual needs of societies in different parts of the world. This is exemplified by the contributions of *Aung Ko Thet and Sein Sandar Hlaing* from Myanmar and *Elena Rotoklyta* from Kasachstan who describe local and national approaches to climate change in their respective home regions.

This publication does not aim at giving answers to all the questions raised in this brief introduction. It neither contains concrete demands to the international community. It is rather a loose collection of essays from participants to the conference – reflecting the above mentioned fundamental differences in approaching the issue of climate change and reflecting the key lines of discussion during the conference. But while there is a lot of disagreement, the authors would probably all agree on one thing: it is time to act, and if the governments on the international stage fail to do so, let us get started at the personal, local, national or regional level!

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Why is Poland *l'enfant terrible* of European climate policy? The role of Poland in climate negotiations from COP 18 to COP 19.



Artur Wieczorek,
Poland

Between November 26th and December 8th 2012 the 18th Conference of Parties (COP 18) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) took place in Doha, Qatar. Agreement was reached there to extend the Kyoto Protocol to second commitment period (between 2013 and 2019), additionally further steps were taken on the road to an international commitment limiting CO₂ emissions, to be signed by 2015. The summit also chose Poland to host the next UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP 19) in 2013. I attended COP 18 as an 'Adopt a Negotiator Fellow' (adoptanegotiator.org) of the Global Campaign for Climate Action, and I was able to track the Polish team of negotiators and report on the progress of the negotiations.

At the previous conference in Durban in 2011, parties had agreed that a new binding global agreement to reduce CO₂ emissions would be reached by 2015, so we couldn't expect any groundbreaking deal from COP 18 in 2012. The major issue that needed to be resolved was how to fill the period between the end of the first Kyoto Protocol commitment period (2005-2012) and the time when the future agreement is supposed to take effect (2020). Thus an agreement on extending the Kyoto Protocol to a second commitment period (2013-2019) was needed.

The disagreement between Eastern European countries on the one side and the European Commission, developing countries and environmental NGOs on the other side over the issue of unused CO₂ emission permits (AAUs) was one of the bones of contention. Poland has a huge surplus of emission permits from the first Kyoto Protocol commitment period and insisted on transferring them to the second (2013-2019) and future (post-2020) commitment periods. Although this surplus does not come from actual mitigation efforts but is the result of Poland's transformation from a communist to a capitalist economy (Polish CO₂ emissions fell by over 30% in the 1990s due to the restructuring of big industry), Poland strongly opposed forfeiting this surplus and insisted on a full carryover. Environmental NGOs argued that such a huge surplus available on the emissions market would 1) lower the price of emission certificates, 2) remove

economic incentives to limit emissions, 3) and thus seriously hinder the efforts to limit global CO₂ emissions.

Due to its position on the transfer of the AAU surplus Poland was under strong international pressure during the COP 18 in Doha. Its stance was strongly opposed by the coalition of environmental organizations (Climate Action Network) from the first days of COP 18. Many actions were undertaken to put pressure on Poland, but the Polish Minister of Environment, Marcin Korolec, remained calm and confident. The European Union as a whole was also heavily criticized by NGOs for "being bullied" by Poland and failing to raise its ambition.

Not until late afternoon on December 8th, almost 24 hours after the conference was scheduled to end, agreement on the AAU issue had finally been reached. The final compromise allows Poland (and other countries that signed the second commitment period) to keep its surplus, but makes it to a large extent unsaleable – each potential buyer can only buy a maximum of 2% of other countries' surpluses and all of the potential buyers have already declared that they have no intention of buying it. However, this is only a political declaration and it is not binding. The surplus will be also transferred to the post-2020 commitment period, and Poland already declared it hopes to sell the surplus then.

The challenge lies ahead of Poland – as a host of COP 19 it will be in the spotlight and has to prove its organizational skills and commitment to fight climate change. But the true challenge lies ahead of Polish, European and global environmental NGOs and movements – convincing the Polish government to raise its mitigation efforts will be a hard task. Its intention is not to raise its ambition, but to keep the status quo and ensure that Polish economic interests are protected. The Polish Minister of Environment, Marcin Korolec, is very frank about it and has spoken openly in various interviews in the Polish media: "We have applied to host COP 19 in order to have a better negotiating position and have more ability to convince Europe to our ideas."

To understand the Polish negotiating position one has to understand the Polish mentality as well as the economic reality. Poland has always perceived itself as a

*"I DON'T THINK
THE MAIN GOAL
FOR GOVERNMENTS
IS GROWTH; IT
IS DEVELOPMENT
- AND THAT'S
NOT THE SAME."*

*"We have to be very careful about
talking about things like 'de-growth'
and putting down consumer
consumption because those choices
are fundamentally about reducing people's
freedom to choose and freedom to
make their lives better for their children."*

selected quotes from participants on fesglobal.org

developing country, a country in transformation from Communism to capitalism and always compared itself to Western Europe. The level of development of Poland has drastically changed over the last 10 years. In 1999, Poland joined NATO, and in 2004 the EU – and this year symbolically marks the transition from a developing to a developed country. Poland is now a proud member of the club of developed countries – the EU. And it has shifted from an aid recipient to a donor. But the mentality is not there, yet.

Poland sees development and environment protection as contradictory imperatives. We look up to Western Europe, saying "We want to be as developed as them, and they are trying to slow us down." Poland's stance resembles the position of rapidly industrializing economies, such as India and China – "the West" had its opportunity, now it's our time to develop and we should have the full right to it. Only that the world has no more time to wait for Poland or any other country. Climate change won't wait – it's either all hands on deck, or we all sink.

The second important factor is the fact that 90% of Polish electric energy comes from coal – the dirtiest energy source – and most of the energy companies are at least partially state-owned. In consequence, coal-powered energy producers constitute a powerful lobby with strong influence on government and policy. Moreover, Poland has large natural reserves of coal, which is considered an important factor in our national security. In other countries that have more diversified power sources, climate change and energy policy are not so much connected – e.g. Germany invested in renewables and France in atomic energy, whereas Poland greatly depends on coal. In Poland climate and energy policy are strictly entangled and you can't talk about one without the other.

The Polish Minister of Environment can adopt such an anti-climate position only because he has the full support of large parts of Polish society. Trade unions and ordinary citizens are concerned that a commitment to reducing CO₂ would lead to huge layoffs in the energy sector and rising energy prices. Coal is also seen as an energy source that allows more independence from

unpredictable Russia (whereas coal can be obtained domestically, gas is mainly imported from Russia which can turn the valve on and off, depending on political will). Fighting against climate change and protecting the environment is widely perceived as a luxury that we can't afford when there are much more pressing issues – development, economic interests, energy security. And the Minister is able to sell his obstructions and strong stance against raising ambitions internally as a success of Poland in defending the country's economic interests from pressure of European bureaucrats and lobbies.

If we want to advance the Polish negotiating position to becoming more flexible and climate-friendly, we need to break this narrative instead of just reinforcing it by putting on external pressure. We need an authentic, bottom-up climate movement, we need support and incentives for renewables and, finally, Europe needs to send a strong political signal that the Polish energy security issue is also a European energy security issue and that the country won't be left alone to face Russia.

The next COP will take place in Warsaw at the end of 2013. I have a strong feeling it won't bring any breakthrough in the negotiations, but it will be very important for the internal debate on climate change in Poland – the Polish negotiating position in the long term will depend on the ability of civil society, activists and international NGOs to break the dominating narrative and establish a new one in which Poland's advancement is a key to changing international climate politics. In short, we need to convince the Polish society that climate change is real and a pressing issue and that mitigation efforts are not against our national interest

It is Time for a More Effective Route to Addressing Climate Change than the UN



Andrew Holland,
USA

On December 8th, the 18th “Conference of the Parties” (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) ended in Doha, Qatar. The negotiations successfully agreed to begin negotiations on a continuation of the Kyoto Protocol, the landmark 1997 agreement that, for the first time, put binding restrictions on emissions, at least from some countries. Kyoto has expired at the end of 2012, and there was a real chance that, without a compromise the important work of Kyoto would have gone away. Also agreed at Doha was that there will be a new fund dedicated to developing countries to repair the “loss and damage” caused by climate change.

Although there have been great diplomatic agreements – and some failures along the way – we have seen little in the way of actual reductions in global carbon emissions. Although diplomats have met every year since the Rio Earth summit in 1992, there has been no success in actually reducing total global emissions or the concentration of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere.

Climate change is the most difficult ‘collective action’ problem that the international community faces. No matter how much each country may want to reduce emissions – and we should believe negotiators when they say that their country wants to solve climate change – in these collective action problems there will always be incentives to cheat or to push commitments onto others. Unfortunately, the UN process has enshrined these incentives into its principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities.” Developing countries are encouraged to shift the responsibility to developed (annex I in UNFCCC parlance) countries, while developed countries can complain that large emitters like China, India, or others are not required to meet any commitments.

The result is that the UN has failed in its mission to reduce or slow the growth of emissions. There are those that would then ask: What to replace the UN? That is the wrong question to ask. Instead, addressing climate change should be a priority at every international negotiation.

We must stop thinking of climate change as purely an ‘environmental’ problem. That allows national leaders to place it in a policy ghetto where only campaigners care about. Instead, we have to realize that climate change

affects all areas of government – from national security to economic growth, energy production to national disasters. That means that every ministry has an interest in addressing climate change. We should therefore ‘mainstream’ negotiations on climate change, whether mitigating emissions, finance for adapting to climate change’s effects, or support for repairing losses and damage from climate change.

Throughout the mid 2000s, for example, climate change was negotiated at almost every major international forum. The 2005 G8 meeting in Scotland prioritized action on global warming, and was the first multilateral statement validating that humans were responsible for warming. Since the 2008 financial crisis and the ensuing years of debt, currency, and economic problems, climate change has fallen to a lower level on the international agenda. That is unfortunate, because climate change will impact, and ultimately overwhelm all of these areas if we do not slow it. Action on climate change should be on the agenda of every major international meeting. Like the UN, we should not expect that the communiqués or non-binding resolutions from these meetings will solve the problem; but, the high-level attention can act as a motivating force for action at home.

Another way that we have failed in these negotiations is with an obsession with negotiating a ‘legally binding’ treaty. The truth is that there is no such thing as ‘legally binding’ in international relations. Sovereign governments will never cede their right to determine what is best for their country. In 1928, the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war was overwhelmingly signed and ratified by most countries in the world. Almost immediately, the treaty was shown to be ineffective and naïve. I’m afraid that environmentalists are making the same mistake that anti-war activists did at that time. Canada’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011 should serve the same role that the Italian invasion of Abyssinia did in 1935 – make us aware that just as no treaty can prevent war, no treaty can prevent a nation from seeking to expand its economy.

However, we should not do away with the UN’s role on climate change entirely. The UN serves a very important role in international relations as a validator. Only

Mariana González Araujo,
Mexico



Climate change does not pay off politically ... yet

the universal nature of the UN's membership can give the legitimacy to international deals. One of the most important roles that the UNFCCC will be asked to play in the coming years is as the non-partial validator of countries' commitments. They will have to verify that the measured and reported emissions of a country are enough to meet their agreed upon commitments. This role will test the UN, but there is no other body that can provide the needed legitimacy.

International emissions reductions are needed now. We should not let ideology or a misguided commitment to internationalism stop us from seeking out the most effective ways to bring about international emissions reductions.

In 2013, climate change remains high on the political agenda around the world. Green issues are getting increasingly important even for those that used to consider them unpopular, such as politicians running for elected office. To understand this development, we have to look at three events in 2012 that have been relevant for the climate policy agenda: The Río Earth Summit, the US presidential elections and the 18th Conference of the Parties (COP18) in Doha, Qatar.

The Earth Summit Río+20

20 years after the first Río Summit in 1992, the Brundtland report (1983) was finally translated into 27 principles showing the path to raising awareness and to getting a stronger commitment within the UN system to sustainable development (SD) and climate change (CC) issues.

Consequently, the main objectives of Río+20 were (IEPF 2012, 70):

- To guarantee renewed political commitment for SD;
- To assess the progress to date and the remaining gaps in the implementation of the outcomes of the major summits on SD;
- To address new and emerging challenges.

The main themes, i.e. the *mechanisms* to monitor and measure the progress in achieving the above commitments were:

- The green economy in a context of SD and poverty eradication;
- The institutional framework for SD.

Consequently, the representatives in Río *could have* committed to:

- a) An upgrade of the UNEP (United Nations Environment Program) in order to reach political agreements and to have an institutional framework for SD.
- b) The decision to establish the office of a High Representative for Future Generations, with the task of promoting the intergenerational dialogue.

“The concept of de-growth is not to be understood as the ‘2013 worldwide policy recommendation’. The key is to think it as a transitional process which includes common and personal behavior long-term. In fact, it’s a new paradigm. And the pressure to pushing the development of this new paradigm will not necessarily come from the “rich countries” but from those people that realize the urgency to deal with the daily climate change challenges.”

selected quotes from participants on fesglobal.org

- c) The inclusion of formal and non-formal education on sustainable development, with the aim of addressing the challenge of changing consumption patterns in order to reduce carbon emissions.

But they didn’t commit to any of this, not even to the clearest of the suggestions, the UNEP upgrade. This was due to the lack of consensus and it was first and foremost the G77-China bloc that was in opposition.

US Presidential elections

Considering that the latest NOAA report (NOAA 2012) states that 2012 was the warmest year in the US since the beginning of records in 1895, climate change could have been expected to be play a key role in US politics. And when at the end of October New York City was seriously affected by the hurricane Sandy, the world’s eyes were on the US and suddenly the news wasn’t the debates between Romney and Obama but whether climate change matters or not.

Obama took this disaster seriously, and he said so in a meeting with officials from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (New York Times 2012). The same man that didn’t ratify the Kyoto Protocol and was reluctant to commit to GHG reductions was addressing the necessity to take the climate change seriously and included it in his acceptance speech on election night. And he also mentioned it in his first press conference about the planned measures for his upcoming term, some of which were already in place from his previous presidential period – such as renewable energy subsidies, strict fuel-economy standards, regulations on coal-fired power plants and heat-trapping carbon emissions (Plumer 2012).

These developments give some indication of what is happening in US domestic politics regarding climate change but in the international arena Obama’s position is not ambitious enough, as he needs to deal with a Republican-dominated US Congress and with the main oil producers in the world that just met at the COP18.

COP18

For us, as part of the Major Group of Children and Youth (MGCY), the requests were clear enough: upgrade UNEP, and establish an ombudsman for future generations in order to make the voice of youth heard and to include it in the future development agenda.

Regarding the UNEP upgrade we could say we scored half a point. After all, the UN committed to the strengthening of this agency, even though this didn’t happen at the COP18 but at the 67th meeting of the General Assembly. It wasn’t exactly UNEP’s promotion to the new United Nations Environment Organization (UNEO) that we had in mind but it was the strong statement that was desired ever since UNEP’s creation at the Stockholm Conference in 1972:

“The decision by the General Assembly to strengthen and upgrade UNEP is a watershed moment. Universal membership of UNEP’s Governing Council establishes a new, fully-representative platform to strengthen the environmental dimension of sustainable development, and provides all governments with an equal voice on the decisions and actions needed to support the global environment, and ensure a fairer share of the world’s resources for all,” said UNEP Executive Director Achim Steiner (UNEP 2012).

And what happened to the ombudsman proposal that the representatives left in the box in Río+20? They left it in the box again in Doha. We kept working on an inclusive dialogue and we managed to put some youth perspective on Article 6th within the non-formal education scheme but that was it.

This was what was left of an old demand derived from principle 3 of the Río Declaration: *“The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations”* (UNEP 1992).

Concerning the development agenda beyond the review of the Millennium Development Goals in 2015 there is a great deal of uncertainty. At Río+20 we heard about a proposal for Sustainable Development Goals being presented by Colombia but it was not pursued



any further. At the COP18 we didn't even hear about sustainable development anymore, and the only concept being discussed was the "Green Economy", which we are still in the process of reviewing. According to UNEP, "in its simplest expression, a green economy can be thought of as one which is low carbon, resource efficient and socially inclusive."

The Green Economy concept is mainly supported by Brazil, South Korea, the United States, Ethiopia, Japan, Indonesia and the European Union. But despite this broad group of supporters, there is still no consensus about the concept, not even an agreed-upon definition of the term. For South Korea e.g. it is almost synonymous with green growth but for the EU it is a rather abstract concept that refers to a range of development "tools" (IEPF 2012, 80-82).

So what are its implications? When we talk about low carbon strategies we have to keep in mind that words can make a big difference. Consider the COP16 negotiations in Cancun, Mexico in 2010 when it made a big difference whether negotiators were talking about clean or renewable sources of energy, because in the former definition nuclear energy is still an option. At the COP18, on the contrary, we knew what we were talking about but the debate had changed. The Qatari hosts talked about the transfer of technology, about efficiency and sustainability, but they also said that they still had oil and were going to use it.

The proposal here – again, not legally binding – was a kind of "parallel" development, which basically means that the countries will continue to grow on the basis of fossil fuels but will complement this with some voluntary attempts at lowering their emissions. The only unanimous agreement was about the next conference being held in Warsaw, Poland.

Conclusion

"Another world is possible"... and although some governments or world leaders would not agree I see the green agenda out of the box. It is out in the open and it has developed the potential to become profitable. These profits will not always come in the form of money but as political capital, efficiency gains, trade opportunities or an improved public image, which will turn into money sooner or later as well, and people are beginning to realize this.

So in the future we could see cases of countries transferring know-how and technology, helping others to become more sustainable. And we should take a close look here, because we might find that this help is going to cost and that these costs could be comparable to the ones incurred in the past as interest payments on external debt. And we should listen carefully to the political justifications because it is quite probable that climate change, sustainable development or any other green



Varun Sharma,
India

Climate politics: no room for the 'skeptic' on science's ark?

concept will be used to justify an economy which is low on carbon and high on resource efficiency but high on social costs. And then we are going to see the priorities of governments, whether to strive for profit *and* social benefit or just for profit, and we will have to show them that these concepts do not exclude each other.

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It seems that the more powerful or popular a term or theme gets the more difficult it becomes to place your finger on the exact purpose it serves, the meanings it generates and the types of authority and relationships it legitimates. Is the discussion on climate change simply about the climate, and not a politics of its own? This is a question that rarely left me through the weeklong international learning program "Shaping Globalization" in Berlin. This essay focuses on my concerns regarding the political ramifications of the science of climate change by using both the interactions at Berlin and events back home in India as a background. In the end I use a largely forgotten discussion on India being an 'ancient civilization' to inform some of my concerns about globalization.

Evidently, the most interesting part of our program in Berlin has been a simulation game we were planted into. As part of the game we were denied the direct opportunity of representing our own home contexts. Thus, the game found each of us analyzing things, setting priorities, and engaging with others from scenarios entirely different from our own national contexts. In a bid to arrive at a global and binding accord—even if staged—it was not long before we so truly internalized our roles that it was no longer difficult to get defensive about positions that were not entirely our own, but granted cleverly by the organizers of the game. It was anything but amusing when I as an Indian, a dissenting nation to the negotiations, was most eager to achieve some consensus because I was part of the game's UN delegation. I am sure each of us was driven to a point of empathy for the significant 'other' in such ways.

After the formal closure of our game – which fortunately for me did end with a quasi binding agreement! – we were graced by the company of expert guests, some of whom have represented Germany at the UNFCCC negotiations in different capacities. And it was here that I began to witness more clearly than ever before an uneasy blurring of the lines between the 'real', and the simulacrum of a supposedly 'unreal' game.

Outlining a day in the life of a UNFCCC negotiator, it was explained how the preparation involved at first getting acquainted with the position of one's own nation. A panel of 'experts', scientists included, would give guidance on this. This position then had to be reconciled with the European Union's position. Another panel of 'experts' would help here. A day at the negotiations

“This is not about saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to ‘development,’ the challenge is to construct a new development paradigm which is based on more than economic growth. We propose a pattern of development that questions the current pattern of consumption and unequal distribution of wealth, and that aims at achieving a more humane society based on a conception of humanity that also includes environmental aspects and democratizes the uses of natural resources.”

selected quotes from participants on fesglobal.org

– being nothing enjoyable in particular –, customarily commences with an early morning meeting with ‘expert’ sub-committees. Based on the inputs received from the group the lead negotiator would then “make up the picture in the mind” and accordingly adhere to the required line.

Indeed, positions are constructed in a far more layered and complex way in the real world than in our game, but whether was the self-determination of a ‘human subject’ (said in a philosophical sense) in choosing his or her own position? Roles and positions seem to be acquired, imbibed and enacted rather than being crafted as per one’s own independent thinking, be it in our game or in the real world situation of a negotiator. It is equally worth noting that while ‘expert’ knowledge in the nature of sciences and discourses plays an indefinitely important role in constructing that ephemeral ‘picture’ in our minds, or the position to which we must adhere, the processes of building knowledge are rarely looked upon critically.

A whole tradition of post-structural philosophy is devoted to such questions. But my own concerns found an added basis when in a meeting with a German Member of Parliament it became increasingly apparent that molecules are made to speak a truth which is not entirely their own. The parliamentarian argued that the very same scientific truth-claims were liable to being presented differently by two important political parties in Germany, namely the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party. In the ensuing discussion it emerged that even within the Green Party, its anti-consumerist position vis-à-vis issues relating to GHGs had significantly varied in times of economic slowdowns. It appears that science after all has a socio-political context and dimension that legitimates some of its truth claims, at certain times, to the exclusion of others.

However, to ascertain the manner in which certain relations of power in society legitimate particular formats and variants of discourses in time is not an easy task. This is tantamount to looking at science critically, and in order to do so one must grievously risk being dismissed or discredited as a ‘climate skeptic.’ One of our guests was rather outspoken in the confession to “hate the

word climate skeptic.” It may well be true, it was argued, that most ‘climate skeptics’ are hired by oil companies and industries to rubbish the claims of climate scientists, “no less than 3,000” of whom unanimously agree with the singular claim of global warming. But to the contrary one finds that the representation of the ‘skeptic’ as a classic outsider trying to sabotage a discussion is not all so correct. The broad fields of political ecology or eco-criticism are quite skeptical as much as ecological in their founding. Likewise, there remains little to be impressed by the unanimity of scientists in themselves, for an equal number, if not more, are engaged in furthering the cause of GMOs in the third world, or even suggesting nuclear plants in some of the most plainly hazardous contexts.

In making a case for skepticism as self-reflection I am tempted to string the afore concerns about the social and political contexts of knowledge-building to some observations from India. India makes a rather interesting case where the links between industrialization and the science of climate change or expert knowledge is a deep-rooted one. Our historians of the sciences were previously thinking that colonial rule unleashed a series of exploitative and irreversible trends that had adverse consequences for our natural heritage.

But in recent times we are witnessing a revision of such ideas, and scholars such as David Hardiman, Vinita Damodaran and Richard Grove have illustrated that a conservationist discourse was as much a part of colonial rule as its economically extractive policies. The terms ‘climate change’, ‘desiccation’, ‘erosion’, ‘changing weather conditions’, and ‘forest degradation’ are not of any recent post-colonial origin in the Indian context, but appear for the first time and with quite some frequency in the British official correspondences of the late 19th and early 20th century. It may not be very hard to say that a discourse on climate change and nature conservation was not simply a reaction to industrialization without also being an accompaniment or a component of it.

Therefore I wonder, at the risk of being dismissed as a ‘skeptic’, whether it is an inherited legacy of our colonial past that one of the primary institutions currently engaged in studying climate change in India was in fact a

"I think it is our consumption patterns that are the main problem leading towards climate change. If the entire world pretends that "development" means consuming like western societies do, this will eventually mean the destruction of our planet; thus I would focus on discouraging consumerism, probably through taxation."

selected quotes from participants on fesglobal.org

start-up project of one of the leading corporations in India with colonial antecedents, namely the Tata Group. The Tata Energy Research Institute (TERI) was first established in the year 1974 as an offshoot of the Tata group and later evolved into an 'autonomous' body now called *The Energy Research Institute* (also TERI) whose officiating head R.K. Pachauri is also the celebrated chairperson of the IPCC. Though this 'severing' of TERI from its parent organization is often described in emancipatory terms, the lesser-known fact is that TERI and the Tata group, despite their supposedly divergent objectives, share a significant number of directors, chairpersons and influential representatives.

The remarkable ease with which some of the most determined industrial interests and the science of climate change in India can coexist, and even crisscross through the governmental machinery, is visibly manifest in what TERI maintains is its "business wing" comprising 94 heavyweight polluting industries from India. Observers have underscored the fact that industrial giants in India such as Reliance Inc., Arcelor-Mittal and the Tatas are exploiting CDMs to the tune of millions, courtesy an institutional dynamics, and this is not without anomalies in a system that climate change scientists in India are aware of. Indeed, questions have been raised previously on the ability of the science of climate change to be anything but anti-industrial.

Queries such as the ones hinted above are often dismissed. But more interestingly one finds that the science of climate change seems to be compelled by an invisible hand (should we suspect the industries?) to substitute active sites of protest, conflict and relevance for climate change, with more remote, impersonal and non-controversial locales such as mountaintops, unmanned seacoasts, and glaciers. These sites carefully selected to the exclusion of others prove to be more useful for a scientific exploration aimed at the abstraction of the ecological crisis to a global level. The consequence is that the instigation of public debates about them rarely amounts to a concrete struggle or resistance against the movement of capital at the grass roots.

This concern could be elaborated along a series of events in India such as the forced takeover of resource-

rich forests that are incidentally home to a number of indigenous and tribal groups. Clashes between state repressive forces acting on behalf of industrial conglomerates, and forest dwelling populations faced with the loss of their livelihoods has frequently led to the death of protesting tribals. The science of climate change prefers to maintain an eerie silence over all such contentious losses of both human lives and forests acting as carbon sinks. One is left to wonder, in spite of the charge of skepticism, whether the loss of human lives and the depletion of carbon sinks are not relevant to a discussion on climate change and the hyperbolic talk about the 'future generations.'

Media obviously does not report on silences, and so the silence of science on all such occasions goes unnoticed. As the science of climate change seems to become denser, deeper and mystifying enough to be of little use or relevance for a forest-dwelling tribal, we in the public domain frequently fail to notice all that which Science (with a capital S) obfuscates beneath its detailed and impressive depiction of the globe as a unified ball of biogeochemical processes. 'Showing more in order to hide better' may well be the principle that eventually clips the wings of local protests that helplessly try to secure a public footing in civil society in their bid to guard the frontiers of their forests from industrial invasion.

In speaking of the site-selection of the sciences, what invariably remains relevant for the sciences are the very sites that are of little value to vested economic interests in the immediate run to profits, take for instance a high altitude glacier. Such sites are most amenable to alarm calls abstracting the ecological crisis to a global level without instigating any genuine resistance to the movement of capital where it really matters. An example was the 2007 IPCC report stating that the Himalayan glaciers, which have sustained many of our life supporting rivers since time immemorial, would be dried out by 2035. The sciences managed to hit the panic button without explicitly mentioning the colossal damage caused by many of our industries in the very same year.

In fact two years later the UNFCCC sanctioned a controversial coal and hydropower project worth millions in terms of carbon credits to an India-based multinational

“We all are consumers. So there’s no need to put a bad or good label on consumption itself. It’s more about “do we really need to consume this or that?” The answers could be closer to a responsible consumerism in the long-run – it’s not a one day change.”

selected quotes from participants on fesglobal.org

on the basis of ‘scientific’ information put forth by the IPCC. The 2007 report on Himalayan glaciers on its part had the added effect of imbuing certain scientific institutions such as TERI and corporate firms bearing high stakes in energy efficient technologies with centrality, mileage, funding, and the backing of civil society. A better expression of the mutuality between knowledge and power—if one follows Foucault’s thesis on the same—could not have been found until some independent reviewers discovered that the findings arrived in this IPCC report through some very complex procedures had been based on non-verifiable data. After quite a few flip-flops and attempts on the part of the IPCC to disown the report, R.K. Pachauri found himself in a position where he was forced to tender a public apology. But the question remains whether climate change negotiators and the civil society are truly aware of what science does or what purposes it serves.

As citizens we have to recognize that every human endeavour is prone to errors, and so is the IPCC report. But when we see such errors alongside calculated silences we ought to wonder whether what we are witnessing is a “politics of alarm.” Combined with the poor representation of the interests of indigenous populations at global summits we are made to wonder if our sciences are beginning to function in a manner so as to set up a panoramic and animated global stage that provides nation-states now guised as Environmental Protection Agencies (EPA) to meet with the empty pretence of wanting to ensure the fecundity or ecological security of their populations. Truly so in keeping with that adage ‘think globally and act locally’ this science then generates a panic about certain situations at the local level (via alarms) while letting civil society conveniently sleep over a thousand other hectares of forestland lost to global economic interests (via silences).

In summary, a historical conjecture from India may serve to expand our understanding of globalization vis-à-vis such concerns. Where an effort is underway to decode the ‘shape of globalization’ in contemporary times, one finds that for the most part of our days spent under the British imperial regime we mulled over the term ‘civilization.’ Just like globalization, the theme of ‘civilization’ served so many purposes, that it was hard to put a finger

on the purposes it served. As stated above, concerns of climate change first appeared in what could be called a ‘civilisational discourse,’ i.e. in the midst of our colonizers’ efforts to legitimise their ‘civilising mission’ in India, to which the Indian nationalists replied that they considered India already an ‘ancient civilization’ and thus needed no civilizing.

It was in addressing the nuances of the perplexing term *civilization* that the Indian poet and Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore argued that it should ideally signify the ability of a powerful nation to grant those affected by its power the very tools to be able to construct a critique against itself. Contemporary academic discussions on *globalization* have rarely tried to benefit from such words of wisdom. Is it the ‘crisis of globalization’, to borrow from Tagore, that the thematics it comprises, such as the science of climate change, are not self-reflexive, that they are not in a position to allow contradiction, that they are not able to provide the tools for its own criticism to those it adversely affects? Our haste in dismissing the figure of the skeptic only shows that science is not willing to make any space for him or her on its ark, its globalising mission which claims to include the last and the least. The skeptic must now stand like the orient of the days of the colonial old, but only at the fringes of a ‘global village’— and, how must he?

Lifting All Boats – How to Decouple Growth from Carbon Emissions



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“Our economic system is broken.” In a breakout session during the Shaping Globalization Conference in Berlin, participants from five countries contemplated the words written on the flip chart, agreeing in principle that the neoliberal economic model based on unfettered growth no matter the cost was not working. As we continued to brainstorm solutions, it became clear that in many ways our agreement ended there.

Some in the group argued for market-based solutions that seek to decouple growth from the fossil fuel based consumption, while others advocated for a socially politically driven reset of how we measure prosperity. As a believer in the constructive power of markets (assuming a sufficient regulatory environment) to solve social problems, I advocated for the former. It is growth after all that has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty affording the world comforts that prior generations could have never imagined, including the luxury to convene our conference comprised of over thirty participants from across five continents to discuss salient political topics of the day. If we hope to tackle the massive challenges associated with climate change, we will need sociopolitical solutions, but more importantly we must harness the power of markets. Instead of focusing on degrowth, we must focus on regrowth.

During the conference, Former Member of German Parliament and founder of the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Energy, and Environment Hans Ulrich von Weizsäcker identified the central problem with the neoliberal economic interpretation of consumption and externalities. Many people who summon the spirit of Adam Smith, he claimed, do not understand Adam Smith because they have never read him. Anglo-Saxon, neoliberal ideology has effectively convinced its followers that theirs is a completely market-based approach that is built on the foundation of limited government that will lead to optimal economic outcomes. There are two basic problems with this assumption.

The neoliberal economic model is not based on solely on markets but rather on special interests and power hierarchies that lead to suboptimal economic outcomes. Moreover markets are not good at internalizing externalities such as those that are causing global warming.

Adam Smith understood and advocated for a robust role of government, including for: defense, building

and maintaining public institutions, protecting members of society from oppression by other members of society, educating youth, and facilitating commerce. In the case of climate change we need a strong government with strong institutions in order to find viable solutions.

The financial crisis in 2008 provided a useful example for the arthritic, invisible hand of markets in the current system. After all, it was the financial institutions that were immune from government regulations that were the first to go bankrupt. It is time for neoliberals to admit that their economics is not based on a strong scientific foundation, but rather on debunked ideology. If we can shift the debate away from the neoliberal economic model to one that is based on a new kind of growth that effectively internalizes costs and focuses growth based on new forms of creating sustainable energy, we will be able to effectively engage both advanced and developing countries to come on board. Developed countries will quickly see the economic advantages; while developing countries will leap-frog the dirty phase that developed economies have relied on for their growth.

Our discussion during the course of the conference demonstrated that a one size fits all approach to solving the world’s biggest collective action problem is not feasible. As we think through these challenges, I posit that we must avoid discussions of reversing the course of globalization, but rather focus on a new form of capitalism that lifts all boats without raising all the oceans.

A Just Green Economy

The Green Economy Controversy

One of the main controversies in the Rio+20-conference was over the term “Green Economy.” While the supporters of the concept would like to see a comprehensive transition to a society where it is no longer economical to pollute, others fear that a green economy would halt development.

Since scientists explain that actions designed to mitigate emissions are required in the near future in order to prevent the earth's temperature from increasing by more than two degrees Celsius, promoting a green economy seems necessary. Economic tools, such as a carbon tax, are probably the most effective measure to reduce emissions in the short term and incentivize the private market to develop renewable alternatives in the long run.

On the other hand, it is clear why the replacement of the term ‘Sustainable Development’ with the term ‘Green Economy’ is often treated with suspicion, especially by developing nation representatives. While until recently the environmental movement focused mostly on the environmental and social domains, today the focus is shifting towards the environment and the economy. The shift threatens low-income populations in countries which require energy not only in order to develop their economy, but also to eradicate poverty.

Furthermore, the green economy is often a source of controversy within countries. Carbon taxes, among additional economic tools, are often regressive. Since low-income households save less and spend a higher share of their expenses on energy, a tax on fossil fuels would have a higher effect on them. Opponents of the green economy concept contend that environmental protection should not come at the expense of society's weakest members.

The controversy over the concept was not resolved at the Rio+20 convention. Instead, the outcome text of the convention states that the green economy “has different approaches, visions, models and tools available in each country, in accordance with circumstances and national priorities to achieve sustainable development.”

Can countries deal with the environmental challenges facing the world without compromising social considerations? In this essay I will argue that with the correct toolset a transition to a just green economy is possible.



Ro'ee Levy,
Israel

The Just Green Economy

The first step required is defining a vision for the planet. The vision should not be based only on environmental change, a growing economy or social justice but should aim to incorporate all of these goals. While proponents of the sustainable development concept also promote all three goals in principle, they often object to the use of economic tools. The term ‘Just Green Economy’ on the other hand highlights the need to cope with the tensions between economic efficiency, social needs and environmental goals. The remainder of the essay demonstrates how these goals can be promoted simultaneously.

Carbon Taxes

Environmentalists agree that in order to reduce air pollution, mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and stop the depletion of resources, increasing the price of energy based on fossil fuels is necessary. Basic economic theory would justify a tax on carbon in order to internalize the external harms of carbon emissions as a so-called Pigovian tax which applies to a market activity that generates negative externalities. However, as mentioned above such taxes are regressive in nature. Yet, if the government uses the additional revenue to compensate the population hurt most by the tax, the positive environmental results can be obtained without increasing inequality.

The compensation can occur by lowering other regressive taxes, such as sales tax or value added tax. Another option is returning tax revenues directly to the citizens, with a focus on people with low incomes. Note that in that case individuals will still have an incentive to use less energy, since the amount of tax returned will be determined by the total tax raised throughout the country and will not depend on the individual tax payment. The Australian carbon tax serves as an example of an energy tax which was implemented together with various measures that ensure the tax will not be regressive. Measures included an increase in the tax-free income threshold and compensations to low-income households through welfare payments.



An additional option is the introduction of energy tax brackets. According to this model energy taxes will operate similarly to income tax, with low polluters (or households consuming less fossil fuel) paying lower rates per unit of pollution. The average tax rate would still reflect the external damage of fossil fuels, but heavy polluters will pay an above average rate. Energy brackets are used in several power companies, for example in California public utilities, and the model should also be extended to the purchase of gas.

Tax brackets are not optimally efficient economically since the environmental externalities of fossil fuels are not fully internalized in the price low-income families would pay for electricity or gas. However, they may still prove useful since they encourage people not to consume more than necessary in order for their expenses to remain in the low energy bracket. More importantly, on average low-income families consume less fuel in absolute terms (even though they spend a higher share of their income on energy) and therefore such a tax would be progressive. Finally, tax brackets make sense as a concept, since every household has a right to a basic amount of energy at a decent price, to heat their home and commute to work.

Public Transportation

A second measure required in order to promote a just green economy is a greater reliance on public transportation. Private vehicles use, constantly increasing worldwide, contributes greatly to carbon emissions and air pollution. Public transportation is a necessary public good, since the usage of cars creates congestion and has negative impacts on other commuters. Therefore, an efficient public transportation system can lower long-term investment in roads, save time wasted in traffic jams and reduce fatal accidents. The developing world has an interest in developing such a system now, before a 'car culture' becomes part of society. Furthermore, such a system enables equal opportunities to all citizens regardless of their ability to own a vehicle. Accessible transportation provides new work opportunities, often key to social mobility.

Once a reliable, affordable and effective public transportation system is provided, many measures can be introduced to reduce the usage of cars. These may include a congestion charge, similarly to the charge implemented in London, a car purchase tax, and public transportation discounts (subsidies). These measures will probably not be regressive, and in any case, the population will have an option to avoid them by using public transportation.



Alana Moraes,
Brazil

Other voices, other issues: Promoting indigenous peoples' knowledge and popular movements in the international arena

Low-Income Households and Market Obstacles

Low-income households face unique obstacles that prevent them from taking advantage of environmental economic opportunities. The most common obstacle is financing. In many cases environmental products not only reduce emissions, but actually save money in the long run. Examples include energy efficient appliances such as LED or CFL bulbs, and green retrofits measures such as insulation. Even though these products are cost effective, they still demand higher upfront costs. Many low-income families cannot afford them, and they continue paying higher prices in the long run. Therefore the government should intervene and assist in supplying these products. This can be achieved by introducing a program to replace old electric appliances with new energy efficient models (such a program currently operates in Israel), with direct loans to households which will be paid back through energy savings and with the assistance of the private sector.

A second obstacle common to low-income households living in rental units is the principle-agent problem. In this context, the term applies to the differing interests of the home owner and the renter. Owners often have no incentive to increase home energy efficiency since they do not pay the electricity bills, while renters know that they may not stay in the apartment for many years and therefore such investments are not worthwhile for them. The problem can be dealt with by publishing energy ratings for each building. The ratings would eventually modify rent prices so that they also reflect the apartments' energy efficiency. In addition, owners should be encouraged by the government to invest in energy retrofits (through regulations or taxation).

Conclusion

The environmental dangers are simply too great to entirely rule out the use of proven economic tools. Nevertheless, the climate threats should not serve as an excuse to ignore the impacts on low-income families throughout the globe. Economic tools, some of which were presented in this essay, could and should be used fairly in order to promote a just green economy.

The last United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, also known as Rio+20 took place in June this year in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and brought up an important reflection made by civil society groups especially those linked to social movements representatives such as trade unions, feminist and landless movements, as well as the indigenous peoples. But different from what happened at the first Rio Conference on Sustainable Development in 1992, during this year's Rio+20 conference social and popular movements decided not to participate in the official process and instead organized a parallel forum called "People's Summit at Rio+20."

The architecture of the People's Summit at Rio+20 demonstrates the political situation of the South American social movements and the role which popular movements play in the field of environment and development nowadays. Two aspects were highlighted in the final documents and discussions by all participants from the different movements: The first concerns the central role of social movements in building a development project based on environmental justice and on the experiences of traditional peoples. The second relates to the limited role of the UN and the multilateral financial institutions with respect to developing real solutions to the environmental crisis.

The People's Summit brought together 300,000 people, mostly from Latin America. While Europe and the United States are living in times of crisis, spending cuts and discussions about the restructuring of the state, the countries of South America on the other hand are experiencing a time of economic growth in which the development issue emerges with vitality.

Another important feature of the policy framework that characterizes South America today is the fact that the social and popular movements were protagonists in the rise of progressive governments as well as in combating the neoliberal agenda in the nineties. This aspect helps to understand why popular movements now claim a fair and democratic development project that takes into account sustainability and fair use of natural resources.

"We should focus on harnessing the useful aspects of globalization, i.e. greater efficiency, shorter channels for knowledge transfer and their positive effects for a more sustainable future (as well as a more democratic one)."

selected quotes from participants on fesglobal.org

"Climate change it is not about blaming one another, it is about the common action, the shared responsibility to stop environmental deterioration. However, it is also about giving a 'right to development'."

During the People's Summit the social and popular movements identified the need for a radical critique of the debate proposed by the UN and heads of state and government about the environmental crisis and climate change. The idea was to build a solid framework for criticising what has been proposed in multilateral forums as solutions to the current crisis.

In the meeting's final documents the social movements claim that the solutions proposed in the UN official forum such as the "green economy" fail to put into question the structure of society, the means of production, unequal access to natural resources, consumption patterns and the power of big corporations and agribusiness. For those social actors who started the new debate on environmental issues the multilateral fora promoted by the UN are still committed to the expansion of financial capital without considering the privatization of natural resources, increasing land concentration and the impossibility of ending world hunger.

What popular movements have said is that the environmental crisis as well as climate change affects first and foremost the poor and oppressed people, those who are weakened in their struggle with the large corporations. In their opinion, for this reason the solutions to the climate crisis have to be thought from the experiences of those groups: peasants, indigenous people, poor women, who have had a non-predatory relationship with the land and with the environment for many years.

In the traditional peasant family labour division e.g., the woman is responsible for subsistence agriculture, vegetables and everything needed for food while the man is responsible for commercial agriculture. In this way, historically, peasant women have been developing an ecological agriculture to feed their children always concerned about maintaining soil fertility and its renewal.

The ecological agriculture, natural fertilizers and non-predatory use of water resources has been a central part of life for millions of people. There is a set of practices and knowledge developed by indigenous people that cannot be ignored by the official and scientific discourse. Furthermore it is necessary to strengthen democratic and international spaces for discussion and exchange of

this traditional knowledge as well as to recognize local struggles against corporate expansion and privatization of natural resources.

While formal negotiations between heads of state and government on climate change find their limits in the interests of national elites, social movements, international representatives of the poorest people and those more interested in a fairer environmental paradigm have a lot to agree on. And this has become clear in the People's Summit at Rio+20.

It seems that beyond the wish to exchange seeds, knowledge, and products from a solidarity economy, people also want to discuss the design of a more egalitarian society and a new relationship with the environment. This requires that their voices are heard and considered in the debates, and it is time to create room for international and democratic encounters independent of official forums, by bringing together all these voices and movements and making the local truly relevant for the global discussion.

Indigenous people and climate change: learning from the most vulnerable



Namami Sharma,
India

"They feel...but they cannot help. They are too small in culture. They are too small in the essence of the world. Their help is their being and culture. Combined they are a minority. In combination they are faith – a faith of earth. Let them push their being, their earth and their love of themselves to help those who took their earth and their being."

Anonymous

When we choose to speak about indigenous communities, we must be aware of the variations of definitions that exist across the world. The indigenous population is often used synonymously with terms like "natives", "aboriginals", "tribals", apart from specific local names in different regions. In order to have a common vocabulary and understanding the UN in 1972 came up with a definition which says,

"Indigenous populations are composed of the existing descendants of the peoples who inhabited the present territory of a country wholly or partially at the time when persons of a different culture or ethnic origin arrived there from other parts of the world, overcame them, by conquest, settlement or other means, reduced them to a non-dominant or colonial condition; who today live more in conformity with their particular social, economic and cultural customs and traditions than with the institutions of the country of which they now form part, under a state structure which incorporates mainly national, social and cultural characteristics of other segments of the population which are predominant."

The definition implies that the indigenous population on the one hand are the original inhabitants of the place and on the other hand have been subject to the changing socio-political-economic conditions. The definition also points out that the indigenous population forms a minority among the predominant communities which may be leading to marginalization. Five thousand ethnic groups currently comprise only four percent of the population which makes them too small a faction to be noticed in global forums. However, these groups represent 95% of the global cultural diversity and are replete with worthy traditions, cultures, traditional ecological knowledge of their environment, plants, animals, astronomy, medicine, and natural resource management.

The occupations of most of the indigenous communities across the world revolve around nature and are strongly dependent on their ecosystems. A few to be named are agriculture (swidden cultivation in most cases), hunting, gathering forest produce, fishing, herding, etc. The dependence on nature for basic survival needs has every chance of making them go on an extraction mode! Statistically we find that the indigenous habitats are the densest forests in the world. This shows that the user ethics have to be quite strong to maintain their habitats.

For instance, a map of the Brazilian Amazon recently produced by the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources and the World Wide Fund For Nature shows that natural ecosystems have improved conservation potential when indigenous people inhabit them. There are mainly two pillars to hold the balance between conservation and the livelihood needs - first, the indigenous culture strongly guards the environment with values based on intrinsic environmental ethics; and second, connected to the first, the indigenous communities mostly live in a subsistence economy.

The culture of the indigenous communities is in absolute harmony with nature. Assuming that the communities have been the earliest descendants in their habitats, it can be assumed that they know their ecosystems quite well, since this is critical for fulfilling their survival needs. Apart from holding good knowledge of their ecosystem components, these communities are also known to use the resources in a sustainable manner. The ethics of optimal resource utilisation is embedded in the cultural systems. For instance, many indigenous communities in India have sacred groves and religious fencing. Callicott (1994) points out that some traditional ecology sees humans and nature in a symbiotic environment with mutual obligations leading to respect, a central idea in many Amerindian groups.

While talking about the Native Americans, Sherrer (undated) talks about two types of indigenous occupations: hunting and agriculture. Both included numerous ceremonies and rituals with their way of life and showed respect for everything they killed for sustenance. Animals represented spirits; plants gave evidence of the supernatural, while the land could reveal God. Krech

(1999) said: "If we describe a Native American as a conservationist, we do not mean that he calculates sustainable yield into the distant future ... but rather that he does not 'waste or despoil, exhaust or extinguish,' and he leaves the environment and resources like animal populations in a usable state for the succeeding generations."

The next question that arises is what significance indigenous groups could hold in the present day discourse on climate change. This mainly concerns two points: first, what can the world 'give them' and what can it 'learn or take from them.'

To deal with the first concern, we need to examine the present status of the indigenous communities. As the definition states, these communities found themselves pushed to the margin within their nation states which has eventually seized the voice regarding their concerns too. Most of the policies on climate change are formulated at a larger forum, either at a national or a global level. Those policies however fail to address the heterogeneity of the cultural milieus in which many of the indigenous cultures are set.

How would a policy of creating green fuel affect a small indigenous household? An example can depict it well. In the quest to create green fuel, Reliance Life Sciences, a huge corporation in India, launched its project of growing *Jatropha carcus*, whose seeds came to be known as an excellent bio fuel. Their policies aimed at 'non fertile' lands and working with 'marginal farmers' across a few indigenous belts in the Deccan plateau of India. Marginal farmers by definition have less than 2.5 acres of land which is used mainly for cultivating millets. Other cultivable crops depend on the moisture retention levels of the land, since the farming is largely rainfed. Now, to promote green fuel, the marginal farmers were approached for private lands which directly came in conflict with their food requirements and also the state government for common lands and forest lands which again came in collision with their forest based requirements. Moreover, aiming at marginal lands would give marginal yields, which fails to fulfil the fuel requirements of the globe. Many skeptics pointed out the threat to biodiversity posed by the increasing

promotion of biofuel plants. A simple internet search would indicate how furiously the plant is promoted in the developing countries, including Brazil, Myanmar and the Philippines, which again boast of rich indigenous cultures that can easily become the victims of such a development.

Drawing from such examples, one can state that one thing that the mainstream world can give to the indigenous communities is the 'voice to their concerns' and 'rights to their voice'. This would be crucial for the survival of these communities and their ecosystems. The policy formulations should follow a bottom-up instead of a top-down approach, giving space for and integrating indigenous peoples' rights.

Here it is also important to talk about the social movements concerning the indigenous peoples' issues. Those movements should look beyond borders and aim at the international conventions to voice their concerns. Since the Rio conference in 1992, it took almost 15 years to come up with an official United Nations declaration on the rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007. This needs to be taken forward in creating a sustainable future for biodiversity conservation and climate change which would critically depend on the indigenous peoples' participation and engagement.

The second point of concern also aims at highlighting the significance of indigenous cultures and the need to preserve them. The indigenous communities, with years of experience of sustainably cohabiting with nature, have strong values and knowledge systems integrated in their culture.

As Fikret Berkes (1987) puts it in "Our Common Future":

"Tribal and indigenous peoples' ... lifestyles can offer modern societies many lessons in the management of resources in complex forest, mountain and dryland ecosystems ... These communities are the repositories of vast accumulations of traditional knowledge and experience that link humanity with its ancient origins. Their disappearance is a loss for the larger society, which





could learn a great deal from their traditional skills in sustainably managing very complex ecological systems.”

Different groups of people in various parts of the world perceive and interact with nature differently and have different traditions of environmental knowledge. The important aspect is, with their knowledge the population could survive in the toughest of ecological terrains with less difficulty and more sustainability. Their perceptions and knowledge towards their environment are shaped by their values and worldviews which are integrated into their culture and religion and are handed down through the generations. Apart from utilizing the indigenous ecological knowledge in plant taxonomical researches, a consideration for functional relationships and mechanisms in coexisting with nature could go a long way in contemporary environmental discourses. A common ground of modern age conservationists and the indigenous knowledge holders could also do wonders in forwarding the words to actions.

Lynn White Jr (1973) writes about indigenous religions: “Every stream, every tree, every mountain contained a guardian spirit who had to be carefully propitiated before one put a mill on the stream, or cut the tree, or mined the mountain.” The real problem today is the lack of mutual understanding and respect, and the problems of industrialization, ozone depletion, overpopulation, and resource depletion are the manifesta-

tions of this problem. The future path towards fighting climate change should have due space reserved for the indigenous populations and should be based on an integrated and cooperative approach.

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What role for Central Asia in the future of the international climate negotiations?



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Introduction

Global environmental problems such as climate change require consolidated global action. But despite the growing scientific certainty about the causes and effects of climate change, no significant progress has been achieved by states so far to effectively address this problem at the international level. Much of the international environmental governance literature describes the inability of nation states to address global environmental problems, since they require a “planetary consciousness” and go beyond nation-state systems (Hurrell 1994, 134; Beck 1996).

But how can the present impasse in the climate change negotiations be understood? And how can the United Nations Framework on Climate Change be more successful? This paper focuses on the main obstacles to a climate policy agreement and provides five characteristics a successful international regime would need to have. In conclusion it discusses the particular vulnerability of Central Asia (CA) to the effects of climate change and what position the CA countries are likely to maintain in the negotiations.

I. The current state of climate change negotiations

During the last 20 years, the world’s atmosphere has been warming up while the “climate talks” effect has been insignificant (Cameron 2012). The negotiations have so far failed to produce binding, long-term commitments in the field of financing and targets; they are based on voluntary measures and self-interest. Moreover, the enforcement mechanisms do not work and individual country positions are often determined by stakeholder interests, rather than by the “common global good”. Why is this the case?

The industrialized countries are mainly responsible for the climate change problem while the developing countries are most vulnerable to its effects and at the same time lack the capacities such as infrastructure and financing to deal with them. Therefore, the need for developing countries to leapfrog the dirty stage of development and for financing to be able to deal with the effects of climate change has been widely acknowledged.

One of the pillars of the Kyoto Protocol was the intention to reduce the development gap between countries via the Clean Development Mechanism and technology transfer from developed to developing countries. However, the environment and development aid remains modest and there is a lack of commitment from developed countries and emerging economies to follow the Kyoto principles. The current financing is from 5 to 10 times smaller than what is needed to finance climate change in developing countries (Ballesteros 2012). The governments of many developed countries, especially major GHG emitters such as the USA, are unwilling to cut emissions significantly if emerging economies such as China and India continue to increase their emissions.

But according to the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” developed countries are required to cut emissions faster than developing countries. Therefore, in addition to the motivation to take advantage of continued use of cheap fossil fuel resources, there is a free-rider incentive for countries not to abide by the climate treaty and face the potentially enormous costs of implementing a low or non-carbon energy strategy which have been estimated to reach trillions of dollars in the case of the USA over the next generation (Hayward 2012).

But given the Montreal Protocol on ozone layer depletion was more successful than the Kyoto Protocol; can this success story be replicated for the Kyoto follow-up process? The Montreal Protocol’s main principles, such as its binding nature, sufficient financing and absolute reductions targets could be applicable to the Kyoto follow-up. However, for a number of reasons it is more difficult for the countries to reach consensus on the complex issue of climate change as compared to ozone layer protection.

Firstly, the Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which are held responsible for the depletion of the ozone layer, were used in the production of only six main corporations, making it comparatively easy to deal with this problem by targeting a manageable number of production centres. In contrast, the sources of the GHGs causing global warming are decentralized and spread out, ranging from emissions from coal-powered power plants

“Growth surely has negative effects, but it also reduces poverty and improves the quality of life of hundreds of millions of people. Growth is often also accompanied by technology improvements that can help us emit fewer emissions in the long run.”

“We need more action and less talk. Global issues such as climate change need global actions to deal with. However, answers to climate change can and should result from individual, local, and regional initiatives and then spin over to cross-national and global cooperation.”

selected quotes from participants on fesglobal.org

to stationary fuel combustion machinery and means of transport, including shipping and aviation.

Secondly, the problem of ozone layer depletion was immediate and fast-growing, whereas global warming is happening gradually and its effects are long-term and different for each country, affecting islands and coastal areas to a greater degree. In addition, there is still uncertainty on climate change effects depending on whether a high-risk or low-risk scenario is considered likely (Nakicenovic/Swart 2000).

And finally, CFC substitutes were available by the time the Protocol was concluded, whereas substitutes for fossil-fuel energy sources do exist, but not on a large scale. Furthermore, renewable energies will not be able to replace traditional sources of energy completely in the short-term (at least during the next 30 years, as pointed out by Prof. Dr. Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker at the meeting with us in Berlin), the reason being that energy consumption is increasing. This is the case even in the European Union, where the use of renewable energies is more widespread than in other regions. This is the reason for the strong emphasis put on a more efficient use of traditional sources of energy as well.

Taking into account the similarities and differences of both global problems and of the treaties governing the fight against them, what could be the characteristics of a more successful agreement on climate change?

II. Five characteristics of the successful Climate Change Agreement

During the Shaping Globalisation Conference in Berlin, our working group had the challenging task to provide realistic recommendations for the future of the UNFCCC approach or its alternatives. Our group made several recommendations on UN reform and for the use of other existing institutions, including the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the World Bank (WB) to mainstream environmental goals, especially cuts of GHG emissions. However, some group members had the impression, especially after participating in a simulation of a UN Conference on climate change, that we were asked to

resolve a problem for which there is no easy solution; and perhaps, no viable solution at all.

But sometimes young creative minds can find new and out-of-the-box solutions. And since a solution has not yet been found within the existing regimes or institutions, it could be useful to speculate on the characteristics of an “ideal” regime, institution or agreement. Some of the five principles of a successful regime suggested in the next paragraphs might be made to work in practice.

The *first aspect* is whether a future climate change regime should be binding or voluntary. The majority of countries, especially the developing countries, would prefer a binding agreement, the reason being that when international rules are formally agreed, breaking them is considered illegitimate. As Reisman notes, because small and dependent states are disadvantaged at the international level, they often seek hard legislation (as quoted in Abbot/Snidal 2000, 447). It may not be optimal for the countries to have an agreement just for the sake of everybody agreeing and developed countries providing the funds, if there are no binding commitments to resolve the problem. For instance, does it make sense for the Maldives to accept a voluntary agreement on aid for climate change mitigation without a condition of absolute GHG emissions reduction targets, given that without significant emissions cuts, the Maldives will be under water in 30 years?

Returning to the example of the Montreal Protocol, it can be noted that its success was partly due to its binding nature, which facilitated faster compliance and strong enforcement mechanisms including fines for non-compliance. The Kyoto Protocol is also based on binding principles; however, without the participation of major developed countries such as the USA and Canada it could not be effective. For instance, while renewable energy technologies are actively developed and applied in the countries of the European Union, making it possible to cut emissions, the share of renewable energy is still very low in countries such as the USA.

The main impetus for European governments to launch expensive research and development projects on renewable energy did not come only from climate change

“Countries should chart their own course towards development in all dimensions, be it environmental, economic, social or cultural. Globalization should be viewed as a process that can help countries and societies achieve their development goals and not as a force, the effects of which cannot be curbed.”

selected quotes from participants on fesglobal.org

concerns, but was rather based on the assumption that renewable energies have a future since fossil-fuel resources are limited. In addition, it is believed that renewables make economic sense since their efficiency has greatly increased in recent times, and they also help to reduce the dependency on imported fossil-fuel resources. This view was shared by MP Ulrich Kelber at our meeting with him in Berlin. Therefore, the *second condition* for a successful climate agreement is a long-term commitment to and initially high investments in research and development.

Thirdly, law making on the individual, state and international levels plays an important role in supporting “green ideas” and long-term commitments for solving problem of global warming. Laws can provide strong incentives for recycling and renewable energy use to consumers and producers in the economy. The secret lies in the ability of the state and the people to mobilize resources, including financial ones to support and enforce those ideas. Consider the German example: People in Germany in general have a culture of respect for the rules once they are established. Nowadays, the “green ideology” of recycling is actively promoted by the state, by non-governmental organizations and by private companies in Germany. They save water and other resources and separate waste because of a strong incentive to save money. Living in energy-inefficient buildings is also getting expensive. Education becomes important to strengthen the ideas and laws in practice: children learn gardening, which could help turn them into nature lovers in the future.

In addition to it being binding, involving the full participation of countries (especially the major emitters), and requiring long-term commitments including financial, legislative and “ideological” as well as economic incentives, a successful climate change agreement will also, *fourthly*, require sources of financing, which is connected to the final condition which concerns, *fifthly*, the structure of the global climate change regime.

The only viable source of financing is private businesses, i.e. mainly large multi-national corporations. However, many of the biggest of them do business in fields related to the extraction of natural resources, including fossil

fuels and timber, which contribute to the greenhouse effect. This means that the companies will not be interested in substituting their industries voluntarily in the short-term, without encouragement from governments, non-governmental organisations and consumers.

In fact, the countries’ positions in international organisations such as UN are in many respects the product of domestic politics or big business interests. Therefore, governments of both developed and developing countries are not fully representative of the public interest or of the global public good. Stopping global warming is a global public good, whereas the international market economy is more likely to satisfy individual competitive interests.

Much research has been done about the inability of free markets alone to deal effectively with the problems of pollution, and the role of government in the protection of the environment is widely acknowledged (Neumayer 2003; Elgar/Daly 1993). Dr. Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker explained at our meeting that the roots of the global financial crisis and of the budgetary problems of governments nowadays lie in the insufficient taxes paid by big corporations. This also impairs the ability of governments in the north to finance development in the developing countries.

Therefore, the *fourth* component of a successful international agreement would be an improvement in taxation systems in order to collect the financial resources necessary for combating climate change, together with the strengthening of the polluter-pays principle and the provision of incentives for clean technologies. Taxation of aviation and shipping, as discussed in UN negotiations, could also be an option, as well as giving national taxpayers the choice of whether their taxes should be spent on military defence or on environmental protection instead.

The *fifth* characteristic is closely related to the fourth principle on financing preventative measures on the basis of the corporate social responsibility of polluting companies. But companies are unlikely to voluntarily commit to extensive renewable energies use and will strongly oppose taxation policies in the short-term. And: These industrial interests will be promoted at the international level by state governments. How is it then





possible to make all the above-mentioned four characteristics work for a successful international agreement on climate change?

The *fifth* ingredient therefore is a change in the role of governments and non-governmental environmental organisations at the international level. The principles of supra-nationalism (“above nationalism”) could be applied internationally, like in the case of the European Union, whose member countries are have to compromise some of their national interests in order to gain the “common good benefits” in return.

Of course, such an institution, possibly substituting or building upon a UN structure seems unrealistic in the short term. But it seemed impossible in the past for the countries of Europe, as well, considering their long history of war and competition. But in case the high-risk climate change scenarios materialize in the next 50 years, disasters on a global scale could become a powerful trigger for radical change of existing international organisations. Already now, the nation states are unable to deal with global problems such as climate change because they transcend national boundaries. There will be increasing pressure from environmental NGOs and vulnerable countries on governments and corporations, and here “profits” versus “stringent regulation including taxes” will be a highly relevant question. In addition, developed countries will probably feel an increasing

need to rethink their policies because of negative spill-over effects such as climate migration and terrorism.

III. Climate Change Challenges in the Central Asian Region

How significant is the problem of climate change for the Central Asian (CA) Region? CA countries are not among the major GHG emitters, but many countries, particularly Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are rich in natural resources and have a great potential for further use and exploration of fossil-fuel resources. Renewable sources of energy are not yet widely used, apart from hydro-electric power, which satisfies most electricity demand in the region, especially in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

In terms of positions in international climate change negotiations it is difficult to generalize and define one coherent position since the CA countries are different concerning per capita income, level of development, political and economic freedoms and availability of natural resources. At the same time, it could be said which position *should* be maintained during the climate change negotiations following the common interest of the region: It would be to join the developing and least developed countries ensuring a binding agreement is concluded with absolute emissions targets and with sufficient financing coming from the developed countries.

"Globalization must be a force to create opportunity rather than marginalizing and forcing communities to conform to the mainstream norms. Every society needs its own pace and agenda to determine what development they need rather than outsider imposition."

selected quotes from participants on fesglobal.org

"The trick is to de-link growth from carbon emissions. That's the only way to square this circle. Growth is definitely not the enemy here. Carbon emissions are, i.e. You can grow without carbon."

Climate change as an issue is very much on the political agenda in the five CA countries; mainly because it is a way to attract funding from donor-countries. Some environmental protection measures take place, in terms of natural reserves and parks creation, including environmental regulation, but the "green ideology" is not actively supported by countries' budgets and not yet a part of people's everyday life. The priority problems, especially for poorer countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are poverty reduction, air pollution in the cities, arable land degradation, water quality and drinking water supply in the villages. There is also a problem of insufficient technical research and data collection on the effects of climate change (Rodina 2003).

As climate change accelerates, the most pressing problems in the region will continue to be related to water issues and land degradation. An example can be found in the Fergana valley, where the water division scheme left from Soviet times favours large-scale water intensive agriculture in the downstream countries, including cotton production in Uzbekistan, which already caused the disaster of the shrinking Aral Sea (Micklin 2000). The CA countries are divided on the use of water. Hopefully, given the climate change challenges, they will be united on the environmental issue, when water will be perceived not as a production factor, but as an important resource for environmental quality and a functioning hydrology in the region, including the maintenance of ecological habitats and good human health. In order to avoid negative environmental and health impacts, conflict and disaster, the CA countries will have to manage water in an integrated way, with the help of a supervisory regional institution. Such an institution would be intended for integration and coordination, it would manage surface and ground water together (at present they are managed separately), and it would involve all stakeholders.

Conclusion

In conclusion it can be said that the main problem of international climate change negotiations lies in the inability of many countries to compromise some of their national interests, the interests of large industrial companies in particular, for the sake of the common, "global" good. The analysis of the more successful Montreal Protocol suggests that some of its elements

could be used in the Kyoto follow-up process, however the problem of climate change is more complex compared to ozone layer depletion. Moreover, there is still a degree of scientific uncertainty about the effects of climate change, contingent upon the adoption of a low-risk or high-risk scenario.

As outlined above, a successful regime for dealing with climate change will have to fulfil a number of conditions: it would need to be binding; it would need to have full participation of countries, especially the major GHG emitters. In addition, long-term commitments are needed, including absolute reduction and financing targets, as well as enforcement mechanisms. On the national level, legislation and economic incentives, both negative and positive, are required to realize green ideas in practice, changing consumer behaviour at the individual level. On the international level the polluter-pays-principle will need to be enforced through taxation and an international regime will need to be established. This will probably be based on the UN and will have to see an increased role of environmental NGOs.

On the regional level, the case of CA countries shows that states will be unable to deal with the disastrous effects of climate change on their own, such as water shortages and other problems, requiring regional institutional solutions.

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Climate change is accepted as being the most important global issue by far. This is obvious also for Myanmar, e.g. when Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar in 2008, meteorologists concluded that it had been one of the most extreme weather events in the history of Myanmar. Moreover, scientists predict that the monsoon will be 15 days late in arrival and 15 days early in departure. This would have a tremendous impact on the livelihoods of all people living in Myanmar. Already now, climate change impacts can be seen in almost every year are flooding, coastal erosion and drought in some areas.

In the face of climate change in Myanmar, urgent action is now required to build the adaptive capacities of local people in order to reduce the climate change-induced risks to their livelihoods. This will not only stimulate the process of building climate adaptive capacities at the local level but it could also be the starting point for the formulation of a holistic national action plan for adaptation to climate change with greater participation from local communities.

Environment-related issues have hardly been a main concern for Myanmar's development strategy so far. Centralized systems of decision making and controls are a major challenge for development. Many agencies opt for a single disciplinary approach in developing strategies. This top-down approach creates hassles for the communities and has always been counterproductive. Cooperation and coordination among stakeholders is still lacking in development activities and they specifically lack an environmental perspective. Establishing a routine of meetings and discussions between the stakeholders would create a channel of communication as well as bring new voices into the discussion. Organizing government officials, intellectuals, NGOs, and other stakeholders in order to pool knowledge and expertise and to tackle issues of common interest is the way forward for developing policies related to the environment and to natural resource management in the country.

Environmental organizations should see this as an opportunity and fill the gap by taking actions that build confidence amongst all stakeholders. Concerning the consequences of climate change four critical issues need to be addressed in Myanmar: people's livelihood and food security, scarcity of clean water, deforestation and desertification, and loss of biodiversity.

"Growth is what every government in the world is based on – without growth, there's no ability to pay for welfare (i.e. pensions or unemployment insurance). Without economic growth, you have stagnation: you have North Korea."

selected quotes from participants on fesglobal.org

"This discussion is not about denying economic growth, it's about how we can formulate a new development paradigm that is able to stop predatory actions in the environment."

In our opinion, setting up a public environmental resource center to pool resources would be necessary for local adaptation to climate change in Myanmar. This center would generate information for all levels of stakeholders and the general public, as well as recommendations and policy advice concerning critical issues related to climate change, disaster risk reduction and the environment. These would be identified through research work, peer learning events and working groups with the participation of a range of interested groups and individuals. Center and sector-wise working groups would collect documents and findings from discussions and research, conduct regular publicly announced forums based on those findings, and make this information available for updated findings, recommendations, and advice.

Moreover the platform would strive to be recognized and supported by the government ensuring effective efforts to systematically advocate policies and practices towards sustainable development in the country. In addition, activities of the center would complement other environment and cross-sector actions taken by the government, national and international agencies. The platform would also promote multi-stakeholder participation in discussions, formal communication between government officials, interested individuals and local organizations, NGOs, and local and international experts/academics as well as receiving technical guidance from line ministries and departments.

This platform would benefit all stakeholders including the general public through facilitating knowledge and information sharing to the Myanmar people; to build capacity for institutions, as well as for individuals and practitioners. However the question is who will initiate the setting up of this platform for more effective action towards climate change adaptation on the local level. While the notion that adaptation to climate change is possible provides a useful complement to sustainable economic development, it should not be criticized as utopian. Instead it should be reinforced by the integration of improvements in awareness of climate change and popular participation in development.

In Myanmar, knowledge and awareness related to climate change still need to be improved among local

communities. It is critical to enhance the understanding of the communities' vulnerability and the mechanisms for coping with global warming and climate change, to strengthen private-public networks for responding to climate change and its associated risk. Local people are facing climate change-related events such as reduced access to fresh water resources, food insecurity, health problems, forest degradation, loss of biodiversity, and natural disasters.

Local communities need to learn about ways of coping with climate change by developing local adaptation strategies. Examples for this are rain water collection and watershed woodlot plantations which could contribute to solving the problem of decreasing access to fresh water resources. In addition, disaster preparedness programs and wind break forest plantations are necessary for local communities' protection from natural disaster. This became obvious when in 2008 Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar and seriously affected the Delta and Yangon regions, and many thousands of people died or were injured. The main reason for this was the lack of an efficient disaster preparedness plan. This lesson can and should be learned from past events.

In conclusion, through those climate change awareness raising activities and adaptation programs, local communities will better understand the causes and effects of climate change, and they will learn how important local adaptation programs and strategies are both for local community development, but also on a national level.

Romi Reinecke,
South Africa



Simulation games on climate change – lessons learnt from a personal perspective

Note from the editors:

The following text is a personal reflection on the simulation game which was played during the Shaping Globalisation conference in Berlin. In brief, simulation games are simplified representations of real, often political negotiations. The participants take on the roles of relevant actors and try to realise their interests to the best of their ability while aiming at reaching a solution to the problem given. They do so usually on the basis of detailed instructions about their countries' background, and their negotiation positions and interests (for more information on simulation games, see www.planpolitik.de).

In this case we played a simulation game about the international climate negotiations. The setting was obviously simplified but in the essentials it was still quite close to reality. The participants started preparing for the game already before the actual conference, by researching the backgrounds and political positions of the actors they were supposed to play. All delegations comprised participants from different countries and continents, and as a rule, nobody played the country they were from in real life. Consequently, the game provided the opportunity to get to know different perspectives and viewpoints on the issue of climate change. And, as becomes apparent from Romi's text, to understand better why multilateral negotiations are so complex and difficult.

What can be learnt about the politics of climate change through simulation games, and why is a complex simulation game an appropriate method for a youth project?

Firstly, the use of simulation games encourages active participation from each member of the entire group. It is not merely a seminar where young people can sit back and passively absorb information. It requires independent learning and preparation before the project begins. The depth of thought and engagement with the topic, particularly one as complex and multifaceted as climate politics, is highly beneficial.

With an assigned personal identity and clear mandate on the interests and goals of their specific country, every one has their role to play and cannot sit back as a 'spectator'. This encourages agency on the part of young individuals, an opportunity to empower themselves to act on their existing knowledge and passion for climate protection, rather than merely learn more about it.

It also gives useful insight, from personal experience, on the challenges and intricacies of multilateral negotiations. Reaching a consensus agreement across a broad range of interests, perspectives, and contexts is a daunting task, requiring much negotiation and skillful bargaining on a bilateral, regional and multilateral level. In fact, this process can be frustrating and exhausting over a period of days, and that in itself is a valuable learning curve at what our negotiators are up against in real life!

In terms of a 'globalising perspective', such a simulation game is a unique opportunity to bring climate change activists from different parts of the world together to engage with the issues in a substantive way. This active participation, and the relationship and spirit it builds within a group, facilitates the 'cross-pollination' of ideas and experiences from around the globe during and after the games. A true network experience can be made between different projects, strategies, and areas of expertise. Having a mix of educators, lawyers, scientists, activists, researchers and political party members creates dialogue and learning for all involved.

What are the challenges?



Facilitation and participation

A simulation game requires skillful facilitation and active participation from each member of the group. Encouraging young people to engage with the topic and the specific simulation method in the weeks leading up to the game requires forethought, planning and a good online platform for the preparatory phase. In addition, holding the attention of the participants, and encouraging perseverance, discipline and creative thinking over the lengthy negotiation process itself is also key. It is all too easy to be distracted by personal interactions and particularly modern technology such as mobile phones, tablets and personal computers. This in turn discourages others who are trying to take the game seriously and move forward with important agreements. How can both facilitators and participants work together at all stages for the success of the simulation game?

Language

If the project is to be truly international, this requires careful thought as to the mode of language that is chosen for communication. For example, English may

cover the broadest cross section of language proficiencies from all over the world, but it may be very difficult for a head delegate to express themselves adequately in this language, particularly in the heat of debate. These persons however, may have the most useful expertise and knowledge to draw on towards the negotiation. How can their full participation be encouraged?

Closing thoughts

It is clear that the complexity and richness of the simulation game has many benefits, such as empowering young people to actively engage with climate change issues, creating real dialogue and interaction between different stakeholders and giving personal insight into the complexity of international negotiations.

While a challenging method for both the facilitators and the participants, requiring forward planning and independent learning, it can also be highly rewarding.

Selected Project Proposals

Bridging Climate Perspectives

Ro'ee Levy, Sophia Regge, Roberto Velasco Alvarez and Frank Yawon

Note from the editors:

Towards the end of the conference, the participants got together in smaller groups and developed ideas for projects in the area of climate change and sustainable development. Out of a range of very concrete ideas we present short abstracts of three selected project proposals on the following pages. We hope that they will become reality!

Project outline

This proposal outlines the creation of a global young professional fellowship with the aim of bridging perspectives on climate change and responses among different regions of the world. A group of twenty young professionals will be selected from developing and developed countries. The fellows will work together for a period of three months and will exchange ideas via online communication and by working together on a publication. In each period one over-reaching question related to climate change will be discussed.

All of the participants will first research and write about the issue from their country's perspective. During the fellowship, the participants will learn from the experience of other countries and share their own knowledge by visiting and working in pairs of two for two weeks a global FES office. Following their return to their home countries, participants will write an additional essay about climate policy in the country they visited. A final publication will be produced with a collection of selected essays from the internal and external perspectives, and integrative conclusions on cross-regional responses to climate change. Specific essays with policy recommendations will also be handed to decision-makers.

Expected results

Building and enhancing capacity of young people across the globe, sharing best practices with peers all over the world and creating inter-regional networks. The participants will exchange successful practices used elsewhere, deepening their understanding of the needs of different societies with regards to climate change.

A publication with new comparative solutions that can be implemented locally – in essence the publication will offer a wide international comparison of the issue discussed and integrate diverse points of view. The publication will be spread among the participants' local networks.

Simulation games on climate change – lessons learnt from a personal perspective

Alexandra Kazakova and Elena Rotoklyta

Project outline

As climate change accelerates, the most pressing problems in Central Asia will be related to water issues and land degradation. Inefficient use of scarce water resources and environmental degradation will lead to water shortages in the long term, potentially creating serious and violent conflicts among the inhabitants of the region. Regional water resource management and governance are thus of outstanding importance for the long-term stability of the region.

The project invites young professionals and senior students from all five Central Asian countries to participate in a conference on water governance in Central Asia. The participants will be selected on the basis of submitted essays, related to water issues in Central Asia, which will be published. The conference itself will entail inputs from experts on water governance, as well as a longer simulation game on water governance in Central Asia.

Expected results

Raising awareness among young professionals on global climate change and its effects on water related issues in Central Asia.

Capacity building and networking for organizations and communities, whose work is related to climate change and water issues.

Providing information/recommendations for educational institutions, governmental bodies, non-governmental and youth organizations in the Central Asian region on the issues of climate change and water governance.

Turning Learned Lessons into Public Policy

Mariana González, Pablo Hernández, Nnamdi Maduechesi

Project outline

At the core of this project are capacity building workshops for young rural and urban people on the local level. The workshops will focus on the use of eco techniques for the elementary needs of local communities, such as harvesting water systems, eco ovens and bi-digestors. The lessons and better practices are then systematized and shared, e.g. through the publication of manuals and guides and the establishment of focal points on the national level. In addition, a virtual platform will serve to disseminate know-how on the international level, using existing structures networks in the UN as well as the FES context.

In order to reach out to public policy, contacts will be used with regional FES offices, the political parties and the parliament. First, workshops and guides could be linked with current FES regional projects on Sustainable Development and Climate Change as micro projects that could be conducted in different countries. Second, contacts with political parties and with young people involved in both parliament and government already exist in Mexico. These could be used to start collaborative projects with a perspective on youth and alternatives for employment. Third, contacts in parliament would be asked for improvements in the legal framework for self-employment and green decent jobs and for the inclusion of young people in this process.

Expected results

Create understanding of and awareness about the transition to a sustainable economy among young people; improve exchange and cooperation between urban & rural youth facing the problem of youth unemployment.

Encourage alternative ways of generating incomes in a sustainable and social inclusive way through the building of cooperatives.

Share experiences and best practices on national and international level.



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Pros

1. The existing success of the UN as a platform for dealing with Global issues. {eg The Montreal Protocol}

Participation of all the actors which leads to pressure for action which would otherwise not exist.

